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Care.data proposes to link individual level hospital episode
statistics (HES) and general practice data at the Health and
Social Care Information Centre. As is currently the case for
HES, linked data will be pseudoanonymised before being
released to researchers.1A proposed alternative is for identifiers
(such as NHS number, date of birth) to be pseudoanonymised
at source,2 using an encrypted hash, before linkage is
performed.3 4
Pseudoanonymisation at source will increase data linkage errors,
where two records belonging to the same patient fail to link
(missed match) or two records are incorrectly assigned to the
same patient (false match). Duplicate records and “confusions”
(two patients sharing a record) often occur in clinical settings
(for example, owing to changes of name or address,
typographical errors).
Data linkage errors have clinical implications but are also
relevant to commissioning and research. False matches lead to
overestimation of prevalence (if cases are counted twice).Missed
matches lead to underestimation of prevalence (if cases are
missed) and loss of statistical power.When healthier subgroups
of the population are more likely to link correctly than others,
biased estimates of relative risk can occur. Linkage errors lower
the quality of information available and can lead to flawed
decision making.
Records that can be linked are restricted to those with complete
identifiers required by the linkage algorithm, but not all of these
will be correctly linked. For example, an NHS number might
be present and valid,3 yet incorrect. Pseudoanonymisation will
prevent techniques that overcome identifier errors, such as
partial matching on date of birth,1 and will feedback to providers
to prevent it. And if we want to plan for better integration of
services across health and social care,5we should make best use
of patient identifiers, not scramble them and ignore any errors.
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